

Islamic Education and Muslim Revival Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals

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Abstract: This qualitative study tells the emergence of ICMI as a new political force in Indonesian politics cannot be divorced from its advantages and disadvantages. In moderation, pro circles believe that the emergence of ICMI is, on the one hand, a strategy for the government with its interests, but on the other hand, Muslims can benefit from it. Meanwhile, those who oppose ICMI argue that if it becomes too close to the bureaucracy, it will exacerbate the symptoms of exclusivism and elitism and may even damage the roots of Islamic culture that have been painstakingly built thus far. Furthermore, ICMI was criticized as a tool for election success, allowing Soeharto to be re-elected President. ABRI, which played an important political role from the beginning of independence until the New Order, appears to have responded to the rise of Islamic groups, particularly with regard to the birth of ICMI.

Keywords: ABRI, ICMI, Islamic Education, Muslim Intellectual.

A. Introduction

Since Indonesia's independence, the role of political Islam has gone through ups and downs, and it is now possible to separate it (Abuza, 2006). If a person can separate sugar from sweetness, he can also separate Islam from politics. This description is based on the fact that Islam has a significant influence in Indonesian society. Not only is Islam the religion of the majority of Muslim society, but it also plays an important role in Indonesia's independence struggle (Wanandi, 2002). When the new order came to power, Islam's power began to wane. Depoliticization of Islamic groups and parties occurred, so that politically Islam no longer played a significant role. Islamic groups, organizations, and parties were "neutralized," which lasted until the early 1990s.

The dynamics of Indonesian political life in the early 1990s demonstrated the strengthening of the democratic process from below, as reflected in the emergence of groups that emerged from below, which culminated in the late 1990s by giving birth to a total reform movement that touched all aspects of social welfare, politics, economics, and law (Ufen, 2008). The Islamic groups that have emerged with new political powers have received the most attention among these groups. It's not surprising that political observer Ali (1995) refers to this group as "Political Islam" in a new guise.

The presence of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI) on the political map at the time was inextricably linked to the role of previous political Islamic groups, but what is interesting to note is that ICMI took a position distinct from other Islamic groups, ICMI tended to represent the phenomenon of the unification of the State's interests (Federspiel, 1991). This is what will color national political life with Islamic groups.

In the face of this phenomenon, where Islamic groups have begun to play a role in Indonesian political life, it is not unthinkable that the middle class will be affected. However, the emergence of ICMI as a new political force in Indonesia's political arena cannot be separated from its advantages and disadvantages. In moderation, pro circles believe that the emergence of ICMI is, on the one hand, a strategy for the government with its interests, but on the other hand, Muslims can benefit from it. Meanwhile, those who oppose ICMI argue that if it becomes too close to the bureaucracy, it will exacerbate the symptoms of exclusivism and elitism and may even damage the roots of Islamic culture that have been painstakingly built thus far. Furthermore, ICMI was criticized as a tool for election success, allowing Soeharto to be re-elected President (Qadir and Lalu, 1995).

ABRI, which played an important political role from the beginning of independence until the New Order, appears to have responded to the rise of Islamic groups, particularly with regard to the birth of ICMI. The question then becomes, why did ABRI react negatively to the birth of ICMI, and what caused this?

This paper intends to provide a brief description of the complexities of the problems that arise as a result of the rise of the Muslim middle class, particularly in examining the military's response to the birth of ICMI and the fictionalization that occurred within the military, and in other parts of this paper, it explains ABRI's response to ICMI using political economy analysis.

B. Methods

This article belongs to qualitative (Black, 1994) which intends to explore emergence of ICMI as a new political force in Indonesian politics cannot be divorced from its advantages and disadvantages (Latif, 2004). This study also explains ABRI's response to ICMI using political economy analysis (Teik and Hadiz, 2010).

C. Results and Discussion

The Muslim Awakening and the ICMI

During the late New Order regime, the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) was founded in 1990 (Hefner, 1993). ICMI began as an idea from a group of University Brawijaya students in Malang who wanted to host a symposium with Muslim intellectuals from various backgrounds. They were asked to make a proposal regarding the association of Muslim scholars by Minister of Research and Technology, BJ Habibie, with the encouragement of several intellectuals.

Soeharto later approved the formation of ICMI, which received strong support from the New Order regime (Gazali, 2002). The perception that Soeharto held a “Muslim Card” arose as a result of his approval of the formation of ICMI. Along with other accommodating measures taken by the state, ICMI is seen as a significant indication that the cordiality of state and Islamic political relations is truly institutionalized (Rosidi, 2022).

There is no doubt that the emergence of ICMI as a new force in the realm of political life in Indonesia greatly influenced the bargaining position of Muslims in Indonesia, given that Islam was always marginalized and even depoliticized during the New Order era. Islam is only concerned with culture, so it does not wield significant political power, and even Islam tends to turn people off. This is ironic, given that Islam has the most adherents in Indonesia.

Some observers see this political event as a strategy devised by the New Order regime to embrace the power of Islam, which is regaining momentum. Some observers believe that the establishment of ICMI was part of a strategy of “bureaucratization” of Islam, with the practical goal of domesticating Muslims. This is reasonable, given that the government’s power has dwindled as a result of friction with the military. However, some other observers, such as Robert W. Hefner and M. Nakamura, see this as yet another symptom. Hefner (1993) contends that the ICMI was not formed solely to succeed in the 1992 elections or to support Soeharto’s leadership when he no longer had strong military support. Hefner (1993) witnessed Soeharto and the bureaucracy receiving political concessions from ICMI, but he also witnessed ICMI receiving political concessions from the government.

According to Hefner (1995), the emergence of the Muslim middle class has something to do with the Islamic movement on public university campuses, which reflects reformers’ Islam and is where the process of Islamization takes place. Hefner (1995) relies heavily on the Islamic perceptions of the reformers themselves to get an overview of middle-class Islam, and then hypothesizes that such Islam exists in the middle class, which determines the formation of ICMI (Rahman and Hazis, 2018).

In his analysis of the middle class, Hefner (1995) contends that a new middle class is emerging in today’s rapidly growing urban areas in the new Indonesia. Public universities play a critical role in this transformation. Hefner (1995) mentions Salman ITB as one of the posts of Imaduddin Abdurrahim’s campus Islamization movement. Similar movements have emerged on other public university campuses.

What Hefner’s observations about the middle-class reveal is that the emergence of young intellectuals from among students who receive adequate education in public universities without losing their Islamic identity plays an increasingly important role in the bureaucracy or the private sector. Because the middle class is defined by the level of education and the position held, Hefner (1995) concluded that the Muslim middle class has emerged (Rahman and Hazis, 2018).

Changes in the Political Constellation and ICMI

The New Order's political format reveals an intriguing reality, namely the design of government that provides very dominant opportunities for the military to intervene in all sectors of life, particularly the bureaucratic and political sectors. The presence of the New Order was supported by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI), which rose to the top of the power ladder after claiming that President Soekarno had given him a mandate to restore security, known as *Supersemar* (Order of March 11).

According to Fatah (1994), this is due to four factors: (1) As a general phenomenon of the Third World, the New Order military was the most prepared socio-political force in terms of organization and skills to enter the bureaucracy; (2) the early conditions of the New Order were marked by the authorities' suspicion of civilian politicians who were generally based on political parties; and (3) penetration or even military domination of the bureaucracy is regarded as the most appropriate strategy for securing the development of the country; (4) Military penetration into the bureaucracy became free because there were no significant obstacles from (early) New Order people who lacked the power to interfere in bureaucratic arrangements and influence the direction of bureaucratic policies.

The military's increased involvement in the political sphere during the New Order era made it not only dominant, but hegemonic. The problems are as follows: (1) the military limits democracy by perpetuating a monolithic and semi-authoritarian political system; (2) the military, believing they are legitimately part of the power, exercises strict control over societal freedom; (3) the military is an effective tool for those in power to grip the interests of the continuation of their power; and (4) when the military in practice in the field frequently commits violations of human rights and actual Except near the end of the New Order, when relations with the government were strained, their political position was not called into question.

As the early 1990s approached, the military consolidated both within ABRI and with the government, but the military was dissatisfied with the results. One of the issues that was hotly debated in military circles at the time was that the military seemed to be less enthusiastic about President Soeharto's re-election; the military expected different leadership.

Soeharto recognized that the military was beginning to play a political role independent of its control, and that support for it was dwindling (Gazali, 2002). To reestablish his control over the military, Soeharto began to implement his strategy by appointing General Feisal Tanjung as Commander in Chief and General Hartono as Army Chief of Staff, both of whom came from the student's family and were close to the Islamic group (ICMI). and General Hartono as Army Chief of Staff, both of whom are from Santri families and have ties to the Islamic group (ICMI).

In line with the statement above, Hefner (1995) stated that Soeharto was enraged by the military's disobedience and was determined to teach the military leadership a lesson. Most observers saw the establishment of ICMI as a presidential rebuke to the

ABRI leadership. Furthermore, the establishment of ICMI is an attempt by the president to gain Muslim support.

Soeharto saw Muslims organized in ICMI as a growing politically (Hefner, 1997). The ABRI leadership did not agree with the government's approach to ICMI. According to Harold Crouch, ABRI's positive attitude toward ICMI did not necessarily permeate ABRI's body, which was suspicious of Islamic organizations with a neo-Masyumi. Dissatisfaction with ICMI stems from Muslim activists who used the organization, founded in early 1990 with Habibie as chairman, to press for a new political order that did not rely on the military and reflected Muslim interests. Habibie's statements following his speech in front of the military officers demonstrated his desire for a new order in which civilians have equal opportunities to occupy national leadership.

The increased tensions between the president and the military help to explain the military leadership's strong reaction to ICMI; from the start, the military elite advised against legalizing ICMI. On the other hand, there were several military elites who were willing to work with ICMI. In the early 1990s, military factionalism resulted in the red, white, and green dichotomy. This factionalism embryo appeared in the 1980s, though it was not clearly visible until the 1990s. Indeed, the green group could be said to have not stretched at the time. The opponent of this green group plays alone.

The transition of command from Edi Sudradjat to Feisal Tanjung in the 1990s raised significant concerns. There were only two senior high-ranking officers competing for Edi Sudradjat's position at the time: Feisal Tanjung and Harsudiono Hartas. However, the decision was made by Feisal Tanjung, who had a close relationship with the green group. Since then, there has been speculation that Feisal's rise could not be separated from Habibie's role, which was on the rise at the time because he controlled ICMI.

Soeharto, who was still close to Islamic groups, wanted to bring up Habibie, who was the chairman of ICMI at the time. Soeharto was enraged as well. Hartas, after the 1993 General Assembly of the People's Consultative Assembly, was only given a place in the DPA, which is often twisted to become the "Great Retirement Council". Following Feisal's elevation to commander, Hartono, who was the governor of Lemhanas at the time, was appointed to replace Hartas as *Kassospol*. Hartono's rise is also inextricably linked to the Greens' conspiracy. This is because, while still the Military Commander V/Brawijaya, Hartono granted ICMI free movement to declare itself. This suggests that the green group has a special relationship with ICMI.

Military observers witnessed the formation of the red, white, and green coalition in the 1990s. In fact, there are other indications that this factionalism started in the early 1980s. As Mardjono (1998) stated in his book *Political Reform is Required*. This PPP functionary, now active in the Crescent Star Party, wrote in 1983 that during their heyday, they controlled the leadership of ABRI as well as the heads of political affairs in local government levels I and II. Positions in intelligence agencies are also available. They invaded and took control of *Golkar*, which they intended to turn into a political machine. They also contribute to FABRI. Hartono used the word "they" to refer to a

group of civilians, bureaucrats, and military factions who wanted to gain power (Cipto, 2000).

This group has been an invisible government since the beginning of the New Order (shadow government). According to Hartono, they were successful in obtaining important positions within the bureaucracy and ABRI. Important positions in ABRI, particularly leaders, troop commanders, and intelligence fields that they have dominated for many years. He also revealed that many ABRI members who were still active in 1983 had to retire quickly in order to become *Golkar* functionaries (Cipto, 2000). This description by Hartono clearly indicates that there were factions within ABRI that were distinct from the rest of the organization. They each have their own objectives.

According to Hartono, they were the ones who coined the terms green ABRI, as well as red and white ABRI. Hartono, a former people's representative, also wrote that they reported that the entry of Muslim scholars and exponents into the government, DPR, MPR, or ABRI posed an Islamization risk. "They spread the red and white ABRI versus the green ABRI to divide the nation and the unity of the ABRI and the people, who are predominantly Muslim," Hartono explained. What about factionalism from other walks of life?

Anders Uhlin, a Swedish political observer, describes it in his book *Indonesia and The Third Wave of Democratization: The Indonesia Pro-Democracy Movement in a Changing World*. Uhlin writes in this 1997 book that former Commander of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defense and Security General Benny Moerdani is known to have had disagreements with the presidential palace (Iswanti, 2016). Soeharto has regularly interfered in the appointment of key people at ABRI since Benny left in 1988. Those loyal to Moerdani were gradually being replaced by those loyal to Soeharto. The officers were outraged by this. There were clearly differences among the people Soeharto appointed.

Military Response to the Birth of ICM

The start of the military's involvement in business coincided with its birth. If the military initially did business to survive because the state was unable to provide adequate funds, business eventually became an institutionalized third function separate from the socio-political function. The rupiah wetlands involve the entire army, sea, and air forces, as well as combat units such as *Kopassus* (Cholisin, 2002).

The military then pursued many business fields, including the service sector, transportation, logging, plantations, HPHs, mining, banks, oil, and many others. Liem Soe Liong, Bob Hasan, the Cendana Group, Tommy Winata, and other well-known names have emerged from several periods of business conducted by the military, particularly the army. They are typically large and raised through businesses founded on alliances with the army. So that you can build new empires with businesses that are similar or different.

In Indonesia, the pattern of relations between politics and the economy tends to lead to politicism. This is demonstrated by Onghokham, who observed a pattern

throughout the history of the Indonesian nation in which new rulers would bring their own money man. Chatib Basri exhibits the same tendency, particularly in the ABRI case. He cites the relationship between the accumulation of power and capital as one of Indonesia's distinguishing features in comparison to other countries. According to him, the conventional concept of the causal relationship between capital accumulation and power is better understood from the perspective that capital accumulation can influence power or policy. Large business groups, for example, have the ability to lobby for power protection. Decrees and licenses can be the primary source of capital for a business.

As a result, the military's role in politics is both profitable and economically beneficial, and it is in the military's best interests to maintain this situation. According to MacIntyre (1994), an important element of military power continuity supported the New Order because they had an interest in maintaining the status quo in the form of breadth in influencing politics and substantial economic rewards.

The movements that emerged from the lower classes and efforts to revitalize the Muslim middle class, such as the birth of ICMI, clearly desired more open political life. Democracy can be viewed as a threat to the military's political and economic interests. As a result, the military believes that increased political awareness among the lower classes, as well as the emergence of a new middle class among Muslims, can reduce the military's political power while increasing its interests.

Thus, from the standpoint of military political economy analysis, it can be used as an analysis to see how the military's response to the rise of the Muslim middle class in particular and the rise of the Muslim middle class in general.

D. Conclusion

According to the description above, there were many important events that occurred in the political map of Indonesia during the political constellation that occurred in the early 1990s, one of which is the rise of the Muslim middle class, which found its momentum with the birth of ICMI. However, this is where the problem's complexity begins to emerge; the birth of ICMI has elicited a variety of reactions, some pro and some con; among those opposed to ICMI is the military institution, namely ABRI. The military's negative response to the Islamic middle class's demands for political-economic changes, as described above, demonstrates that the military is attempting to protect its political-economic interests gained thus far.

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